If you don’t see the Device Encryption section in this window, you’re likely using an older device that doesn’t meet the requirements and thus doesn’t support Device Encryption. I have a Crosshair V Formula, UEFI BIOS, an FX-8350 and an AMD 7870 and don't have the encryption option They are trying to tell me that hardware is too old ? Doesn't support encryption?
Does it have a TPM ? Otherwise I am assuming that to be certified for W8.1 HCK each MFG would need to re-submit hardware (fee's may be involved) which could be another reason why 'older' hardware is not certified.
Apparently yes according to ROG forums mods EDIT - And apparently no according to someone else ... No idea Don't need a TPM for TrueCrypt though do you ?
I posted this actually because I DONT want any encryption on my SSD I don't see the encryption option as well so I guess it isn't supported Am I better off installing Windows 8.1 Single Language because I don't need any of those Pro features, I never connect to a domain and I dont need BitLocker or Hyper-V (VMWare Player is much better)
Just reading up on TrueCrypt, this is what they have to say about TPM --- Some encryption programs use TPM to prevent attacks. Will TrueCrypt use it too? No. Those programs use TPM to protect against attacks that require the attacker to have administrator privileges, or physical access to the computer, and the attacker needs you to use the computer after such an access. However, if any of these conditions is met, it is actually impossible to secure the computer (see below) and, therefore, you must stop using it (instead of relying on TPM). If the attacker has administrator privileges, he can, for example, reset the TPM, capture the content of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored on mounted TrueCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains physical access to the computer). If the attacker can physically access the computer hardware (and you use it after such an access), he can, for example, attach a malicious component to it (such as a hardware keystroke logger) that will capture the password, the content of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored on mounted TrueCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains physical access to the computer again). The only thing that TPM is almost guaranteed to provide is a false sense of security (even the name itself, "Trusted Platform Module", is misleading and creates a false sense of security). As for real security, TPM is actually redundant (and implementing redundant features is usually a way to create so-called bloatware).
No thanks Never trust any company that holds your key no matter how religious they maybe, companies means profit first.
Thats exactly what I was thinking. And this comes without any warning, seems like m$ is heading strong to TPM without saying anything.
Not even trust your own company ? You can use it either with Microsoft live account or your own domain group server. What are the preconditions ? "Connected standby" feature which prerequisite "secure boot" which prerequisite "UEFI" Either a Microsoft live account or domain group member Windows 8.1 clean install: automatically activated upgrade: activate manually What happens when encryption is enabled - using a Microsoft live account - and I switch to local account ? Is the whole hard disk decrypted ? I sometimes switch from Microsoft live account to local account and vice versa.